North Korea’s potential membership in BRICS

The possibility of North Korea joining BRICS, the group consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, brings with it significant challenges and opportunities as the bloc extends its reach into the wider Global South.

As a growing coalition of influential emerging economies, BRICS serves as a counterweight to the Western-dominated global system and may develop its own trade currency to rival the US dollar.

North Korea’s desire to participate in BRICS shows a desire to break away from global isolation, broaden and strengthen its economic relationships, and boost its geopolitical standing. Simultaneously, its potential addition could have significant consequences for BRICS.

Although North Korea joining could benefit both Pyongyang and the BRICS group strategically, significant challenges such as North Korea’s nuclear program and economic and diplomatic obstacles make the outcome uncertain.

Even though North Korea is one of the least developed countries economically, its significance in geopolitics is undeniable. Located strategically on the Korean Peninsula, it is at the heart of security dynamics in East Asia, as its regular missile tests and threats towards South Korea, Japan and the United States have a direct impact on regional stability.

China and Russia, both core members of BRICS, see North Korea as a buffer state that helps reduce the influence of South Korea and Japan, which are aligned with the US. They believe that adding Pyongyang to BRICS would increase the bloc’s presence in East Asia, expanding its reach into an important area.

Joining BRICS provides North Korea with a chance to improve its credibility and possibly reduce its current global isolation, specifically by working with non-Western countries.

Moreover, being a member could allow for easier entry to financial aid, building of infrastructure, and forming trade alliances through BRICS organizations like the New Development Bank.

North Korea’s attempt may encounter substantial political and diplomatic opposition from member countries of the bloc. India, a key BRICS member, maintains robust strategic relationships with South Korea and Japan, both of which vehemently oppose North Korea’s nuclear aspirations and provocative actions.

Brazil, also a founding member of BRICS, has traditionally taken a neutral position but could face pressure from its Western partners to resist the inclusion of North Korea.

North Korea’s nuclear program

BRICS faces a significant diplomatic challenge due to North Korea’s nuclear program. Although Russia and China may show some tolerance for Pyongyang’s nuclear goals, the other BRICS countries are expected to reject forming alliances with a country facing strong global criticism and consequences.

For many years, North Korea has been dealing with widespread global sanctions enacted mainly by the United Nations, US and European Union as a punishment for its nuclear weapons program. These sanctions have greatly restricted North Korea’s economic growth by reducing its ability to utilize international financial systems, advanced technologies, and opportunities for trade.

North Korea’s economy relies heavily on a few industries, mainly the military-industrial complex, and struggles with ongoing inefficiencies in agriculture and food production due to its highly centralized nature. These hurdles impede North Korea’s ability to actively participate in global trade and economic cooperation, with China acting as its main support system.

North Korea’s economy is one of the most isolated and underdeveloped in the world, with a restricted ability to engage in global trade and attract investments. While China and Russia have the potential to help incorporate North Korea into regional supply chains, significant structural changes in Pyongyang would be needed, reforms which the regime in North Korea has traditionally been opposed to.

North Korea’s economic imbalances, lack of technology, and poor infrastructure would pose significant obstacles to its involvement in BRICS’ economic efforts, potentially causing more conflict than collaboration within the growing group.

Apart from economic and nuclear worries, North Korea’s human rights track record is also a contentious matter. The government’s dictatorial rule, restriction of basic rights, and treatment of its people have led to widespread global criticism.

BRICS, criticized by the West as an authoritarian group led by China and Russia, would risk damaging its global reputation by allowing North Korea to join. Pyongyang’s inclusion could weaken BRICS’s position.

Few strategic benefits

Including North Korea in BRICS may increase the bloc’s geopolitical power in East Asia, allowing for greater participation in regional security issues. For example, BRICS might aim to establish itself as a mediator on the Korean Peninsula, offering a diplomatic platform separate from Western-led, US-influenced efforts.

While North Korea’s direct economic impact on BRICS may be small in the short term, the country’s abundant natural resources, low-cost workforce, and strategic geographical position offer possibilities for future investment and partnership.

Overall, the potential inclusion of North Korea in BRICS presents a combination of dangers and chances. Although joining could provide North Korea with economic relief, political legitimacy, and a new way out of isolation, the country faces significant barriers due to its nuclear program, economic underdevelopment, and human rights record.

Admitting North Korea into BRICS could greatly harm the group’s worldwide standing and may cause internal rifts. BRICS should seek careful and diplomatic conversations with North Korea, proposing potential membership contingent upon economic improvements and a gradual reduction of its nuclear activities.

This well-rounded strategy could help BRICS benefit from North Korea’s geostrategic importance while reducing the dangers linked to its contentious policies, stances, and leadership.

Simon Hutagalung is a former Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat who is no longer working. He completed his graduate studies in political science and comparative politics at the City University of New York. The viewpoints presented in this article are those of the author.